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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ricardo Ozuna Jr. appeals from his conviction and sentence for lewd
conduct with a minor following a jury trial.

Specifically, Ozuna challenges the

district court's denial of Ozuna's attempts to elicit testimony that his 15-year old
victim had Chlamydia at the time he engaged in sexual contact with her and he
asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ozuna met then 15-year old E.B. and her friend AB. through Live Links.
(JT Tr., p.286, L.11 - p.287, L.25.) Ozuna picked the two minor girls up and took
them to the house he shared with his father where he provided E.B. with alcohol.
(JT Tr., p.289, L.13 - p.296, L.6.)

E.B. became intoxicated to the point she

"couldn't even walk straight." (JT Tr., p.296, L.19.) E.B. blacked out for a while
and when she regained consciousness, Ozuna was lying on top of her and she
felt him withdraw his penis from her vagina. (JT Tr., p.301, L.22 - p.303, L.9.)
When Ozuna gave E.B. a ride to a convenience store down the street from her
house later that morning, he thanked E.B. for having sex with him twice the
previous night. (JT Tr., p.306, L.19 - p.308, L.2.)
A grand jury indicted Ozuna for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 for
having genital to genital contact with E.B. (R., pp.36-37.) The state later filed an
amended superceding indictment adding a sentencing enhancement pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 19-2520G (2) for Ozuna's prior conviction for lewd conduct.
(R., pp.67-68.) Ozuna pied not guilty and the matter proceeded to jury trial.
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After the jury was selected for his trial, Ozuna made an oral motion
seeking to introduce evidence that E.B. had chlamydia at the time of the sexual
contact with Ozuna by asking E.B. "whether or not she had a sexually
transmittable disease at the time she allege[d] that she had sexual relations with
Mr. Ozuna" and by eliciting hearsay testimony from Ozuna that he did not have
any desire to have sex with E.B. because AB. had informed Ozuna that E.B. had
chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.229, L.8 - p.230, L.5.) Ozuna also wished to testify that at
the time of trial, he [did] not suffer from a sexually transmitted disease. He [did]
not suffer from chlamydia, and never came down with any signs." (JT Tr., p.230,
Ls.7-12.)
The trial court denied Ozuna's motion, finding the evidence was
inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. (JT Tr., p.243, Ls.17-21.) The
court further found the proffered evidence was not "constitutionally required to be
admitted" and that "the probative value of the evidence outweigh[ed] the danger
of unfair prejudice." (JT Tr., p.245, Ls.3-6.)
The matter continued to trial with the jury returning a verdict of guilty to
lewd conduct with a minor. (JT Tr., p.695, Ls.11-25; R., p.173.) Following the
verdict and the presentation of evidence on the part 11 of the amended
superceding indictment, the jury also found that Ozuna had been previously
convicted of lewd conduct with a minor in support of the sentencing
enhancement. (JT Tr., p.722, Ls.14-22; R., p.174.)
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The court sentenced Ozuna to a unified life sentence with the first 20
years fixed.

(6/21/12 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-18; R., pp.225-226.)

appeals. (R., pp.227-231.)
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Ozuna timely

ISSUES
Ozuna states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered
evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr.
Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a defense and a fair trial,
when it prevented him from testifying that he did not have sexual
intercourse with the alleged victim because he had been told that
she had chlamydia?
2.
Did the district court err in concluding that the proffered
evidence fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, and violate Mr.
Ozuna's constitutional rights to present a defense and a fair trial,
when it prevented him from eliciting testimony that the alleged
victim had chlamydia at the time of the alleged assault and that he
had shown no signs of chlamydia since the alleged assault?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
life sentence, with twenty years fixed, following Mr. Ozuna's
conviction for lewd conduct with a sentencing enhancement?
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Ozuna failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
elicit testimony of the victim's past sexual behavior?
2.
Has Ozuna failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Ozuna Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It
Denied Ozuna's Motion To Introduce Evidence Of His Victim's Previous Sexual
Behavior

A.

Introduction
Ozuna asserts that the district court erred when it prevented him from

testifying that he "did not have sexual intercourse with E.B. because he had been
told that she had chlamydia," and from presenting evidence that his victim did
have chlamydia "at the time of the alleged assault, and that he did not contract
chlamydia following the alleged assault." (Appellant's brief, pp.4, 16.)

Ozuna's

claim fails, however, because the district court correctly determined the proffered
evidence was impermissible evidence of a victim's previous sexual behavior and
was not constitutionally required.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion.

State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

Questions of relevancy, however, are reviewed de novo.

State v. Zichko, 129

Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864
P.2d 596 (1993).
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C.

Ozuna Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion Because The
Proposed Evidence Was Not Admissible
Admission of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is controlled by

Idaho Rule of Evidence 412. That rule provides that "evidence of a victim's past
sexual behavior" is not admissible unless the defendant (1) complies with the
procedures of the rule and (2) admission of the evidence is "constitutionally
required."

I.RE. 412 (b).

The procedural prerequisite to admissibility was

recently set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The admissibility of I.RE. 412 evidence is determined solely
from the basis of the l.R.E. 412 hearing. See I.RE. 412 (c)(2)-(3).
Under I.RE. 412, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is
generally inadmissible. l.R.E. 412 (a)-(b). A defendant seeking to
introduce evidence regarding a sex-crime victim's past sexual
behavior is required to submit a written offer of proof from which the
trial court determines if that evidence falls within the limited
exceptions for admissibility. I.RE. 412 (c)(2). In other words, the
trial court determines whether it will even consider the admissibility
of the evidence based upon the written offer of proof. If the trial
court determines that an l.R.E. 412 hearing is warranted, the
evidence's admissibility is determined from the basis of that hearing
alone. l.R.E. 412 (c)(3).
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 216, 245 P.3d 961, 968 (2010).

Because the

court found that Ozuna did not receive "the evidence confirming that [the victim]
had chlamydia" until the weekend before the trial was to begin, it found Ozuna's
motion was not untimely nor that Ozuna "failed to comply with that aspect of the
rule."

(JT Tr., p.242, L.22 - p.243, L.3.)

Finding Ozuna's motion was not

procedurally barred, the trial court analyzed it pursuant to I.RE. 412 despite
Ozuna's claim that the rule did not apply to this particular set of circumstances.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has articulated the constitutional standard of
I.RE. 412 (b) as a two-prong test of, first, "whether the evidence proffered is
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relevant" and second, if so, "whether other legitimate interests outweigh the
defendant's interest in presenting the evidence."

State v. Meister, 148 Idaho

236, 241, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Self, 139 Idaho
718, 722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. App. 2003)). Thus, to show error, Ozuna must
demonstrate that he presented to the district court an offer of proof that
established both that the proposed evidence was relevant and that its relevance
was not outweighed by other legitimate interests.
The morning of trial, the district court addressed the issue of "whether or
not defense should be able to address the issue of diagnosis or health diagnosis
regarding the alleged victim of the case."

(JT Tr., p.229, Ls.8-12.)

Ozuna

advised the court that the "first thing [he] want[ed] to do" was to ask E.B.
"whether or not she had a sexually transmittable disease at the time she allege[d]
that she had sexual relations with Mr. Ozuna." (JT Tr., p.229, Ls.18-21.) Ozuna
indicated he then wanted to be able to testify at his trial not only does he "not
[now] suffer from a sexually transmitted disease," he "was not interested in
having sexual relations with [E.B.]" because a third party had told Ozuna that
E.B. had chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.229, L.22 - p.230, L.5.) Ozuna's offer of proof for
his position was:
when Mr. Ozuna testifies, he would testify, I'll make an offer of
proof, that [AB.], the other woman present, had told him that [E.B.]
had a sexually transmitted disease.

On the first case, Judge, the fact that she had a sexually
transmitted disease, Mr. Ozuna would further testify that he has
sinqe been to a doctor, had, basically, a full physical, and he does
not suffer from a sexually transmitted disease. He does not suffer
from chlamydia, and never came down with any signs.
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(JT Tr., p.229, L.23 - p.230, L.12.)
Contrary to Ozuna's assertion that the evidence was being offered to
show his state of mind at the time he was around E.B., thus proving why he did
not want to have sex with her (see JT Tr., p.246, L.16 - p.248, L.9), at best it was
evidence of a prior sexual act used merely to paint the victim as a person of
questionable moral character who had contracted a sexually transmitted
disease-the very thing prohibited by Rule 412. The district court pointed out
that contrary to Ozuna's assertion, asking his victim if she had a sexually
transmitted disease "would certainly be an inquiry about the truth of the
allegation."

(JT Tr., p.255, Ls.7-12.) The court found that "giving the jury the

impression that the alleged victim was promiscuous, having sex with people" was
not outweighed by the probative value of such evidence. (JT Tr., p.248, Ls.1015.) The district court properly held that Ozuna had failed to demonstrate that he
was entitled to admission of the evidence under the constitutional right exception
to the rule. (JT Tr., p.245, Ls.2-6.)
Ozuna asserted below and asserts on appeal that the evidence he was
seeking to introduce at trial did not fall under I. R. E. 412 because he was not
introducing it for the truth of the matter asserted.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.)

His own position at the hearing on his oral motion belies this point. He advised
the court that the first thing he wanted to be able to do was ask the victim if she
in fact had chlamydia at the time Ozuna had sexual contact with her. (See, JT
Tr., p.229, Ls.17-21.)

Ozuna indicated he would then follow up with his own

testimony that he had "basically, a full physical" and never "came down with any
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signs" of chlamydia. (JT Tr., p.230, Ls.1-12.) Asking a victim of a sexual offense
if she had a sexually transmitted disease contracted prior to her being sexually
active with a defendant is by its very nature asking about prior sexual behavior of
the victim. The district court agreed, finding "the suggested evidence is evidence
of a victim's past behavior, suggesting that she had past sexual activities." (JT
Tr., p.243, Ls.17-21.)
Ozuna argues that his attempt to testify at trial as to A.B.'s statement to
him that E.B. had chlamydia was not covered by I.RE. 412 because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show why he was not interested
in having sexual contact with E.B.

(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10.) However, the

only evidence of this conversation is the uncorroborated word of Ozuna himself.
If the Court were to determine such hearsay evidence was not covered by I.RE.
412, the trial court correctly determined

that the probative value of such

evidence did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.

(See JT Tr., p.244,

L.22 - p.245, L.248, L.15.)
Because the Idaho appellate courts have not directly addressed this issue,
Ozuna cites to Reece v. State, 383 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), for his
position that evidence of a victim's contracting a sexually transmitted disease is
not evidence of the kind of prior sexual behavior sought to be excluded by l.R.E.
412. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) Reece is a case that involved the state
attempting to show that a victim contracted a sexually transmitted disease from
the defendant and the defendant objecting to the trial court's refusal to allow him
to counter that with evidence that he did not in fact have a disease to sexually
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transmit and was therefore not the one responsible for committing the sexual
offense he had been accused of. 383 S.E.2d at 574.
Reece is distinguishable from the present case wherein Ozuna is
attempting to introduce evidence that his victim had a sexually transmitted
disease which she contracted prior to his meeting her in order to show that since
he did not contract a sexually transmitted disease from his victim, he did not have
sexual contact with her.

However, Ozuna's offer of proof that he had

subsequently been tested by a doctor does not establish that he was not infected
after the sexual contact occurred nor does it rule out the possibility that Ozuna
had sexual contact with E.B.

Ozuna has failed to establish the district court

erred by analyzing the evidence proffered under l.R.E. 412 and concluding it was
inadmissible.
Finally, even if it was error for the district court to exclude evidence that
his victim had tested positive for chlamydia prior to his contact with her and
Ozuna's own self-reported negative chlamydia status at the time of trial, any error
was harmless.

In State v. Pena-Rojas, 822 A.2d 921 (R.I. 2003), the Rhode

Island Supreme Court found the failure of the trial court to exclude evidence that
the defendant was "free of any sexually transmitted diseases" where there was
evidence that the victim had sexual contact with another man on the same
evening he was alleged to have had sexual contact with her was harmless error
based on the other evidence presented at trial:
Most importantly, other evidence implicated defendant as the
person who had sexual relations with the victim on the date in
question, including the victim's testimony, her identification of the
location of the motel where the assault too place, her identification
10

of defendant from a police-assembled photographic array, and the
physical evidence of motel records identifying defendant as the
person who rented the motel room. Thus, if it was error for the trial
justice to exclude evidence that defendant was free of any sexually
transmitted diseases, it was harmless error.
822 A.2d at 924.
In this case, any error in the exclusion of evidence was harmless in light of
the overwhelming evidence implicating Ozuna as E.B.'s offender. '"Where error
concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] is whether there is
a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 84 7, 979 P.2d
1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d
936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991 )).
Here, E.B. identified Ozuna from a photo-lineup conducted at the
beginning of the investigation.

(JT Tr., p.312, L.23 - p.315, L.1.)

Ozuna

ultimately admitted to having been with E.B. on the evening in question and
although he initially denied having any sexual contact with E.B., Ozuna testified
at trial that he woke up to E.B. "straddling" him while he was wearing only his
"boxers and a tank top." (JT Tr., p.608, Ls.1-14.) Most importantly, however, as
evidence presented implicating Ozuna as the person who had sexual contact
with the 15-year old E.B. were the results of a DNA analysis taken from a swab
taken from E.B. after Ozuna had sexual contact with her. The results of that
analysis were that it was "137 quadrillion times more likely" that the swab taken
from E.B. was "a result of the combination of [E.B.'s] DNA and Mr. Ozuna's DNA
than if it had been a combination of [E.B.'s] DNA and an unrelated person

11

randomly selected from the general population." (JT Tr., p.547, Ls.16-24.) If it
was error to exclude the evidence proffered by Ozuna the morning of trial, any
error was harmless.

II.
Ozuna Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion

A.

Introduction
Ozuna argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to give

sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors presented to it at Ozuna's
sentencing hearing.

(Appellant's brief, pp.24-26.) Ozuna has failed to meet his

burden and has thereby failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing a unified life sentence with the first 20 years fixed upon a
jury finding of guilty to lewd conduct with a sentencing enhancement for having a
previous conviction for lewd conduct.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate

court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v.
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006).

To prevail, the

appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope,
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
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possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement.

State v.

Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490
(1992).

C.

Ozuna Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion
Ozuna asserts on appeal "that, given any view of the facts, his life

sentence, with twenty years fixed, is excessive."

(Appellant's brief, p.24.)

Specifically, Ozuna contends that his family support and substance abuse were
"mitigating factors known to the district court at the time of sentencing, [and] the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, with
twenty years fixed." (Appellant's brief, p.26.)
The court considered mitigating factors before sentencing Ozuna,
including his family support: "In mitigation Mr. Ozuna in the relationship with his
family and circumstances outside of his predatory sexual behavior appears to
care about his family, children, has done some positive things in his lifetime."
(6/21/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.17-21.) Ozuna's "history of substance and alcohol abuse"
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was also before the court at sentencing.

(PSI, p.11.)

The court considered

Ozuna's "substance abuse issues" but weighed them against the opportunities
had been given and failed "each time" he was on probation or parole. (6/21/12
Tr., p.45, L.11 - p.46, L.2.)
The aggravation considered by the court far outweighed the mitigation
presented at sentencing.

The court found "the nature of the offense" itself

aggravating, especially where Ozuna was "already subject to registration
requirements as a sexual predator." (6/21/12 Tr., p.43, Ls.16-22.) The court
noted Ozuna continued to deny culpability for his actions and instead attempted
to place the blame on his victim at sentencing: "Mr. Ozuna, I'm a little - I'm a lot
disappointed that you continually attempt to besmirch the victim in this case by
making reference to things that may insult her character."

(6/21/12 Tr., p.43,

L.23 - p.44, L.1.)
The court found Ozuna was a "predator" based on the similarities in
Ozuna's behavior leading to his two lewd conduct convictions, his commission of
the latest while on his third opportunity on parole, and the use of alcohol in the
abuse of his victims.

(6/21/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.14-23.) Those concerns, coupled

with Ozuna's dishonesty in the investigation and his repeated failed opportunities
at rehabilitation led the court to the conclusion that Ozuna "pose[d] a threat to ...
potential victims of sexual abuse." (6/21/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.5-6.)
Ozuna has failed to show that the sentence of twenty years fixed followed
by an indeterminate life is excessive considering the seriousness of his repeat
offense and the impact upon his victim and potential victims when viewed with

14

Ozuna's many previous failed attempts at rehabilitation and his continued failure
to take any responsibility or exhibit any remorse for his actions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold Ozuna's judgment of
conviction and sentence.
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